日本｜1920年代外交政策

chehistory
5月16日
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20世紀初日本外交

細閱資料A及B

資料A

以下段落摘自一本關於下田吉郎的歷史書，下田吉郎曾於1924年至1927年和1929年至1931年擔任日本外務大臣。他主張對中國採取不干涉政策。該段落講述的是日本與中國就日本關稅和在中國領土內的治外法權進行談判的情況。

通過堅持要求明確的經濟利益，下田吉郎錯失了一個實施更具彈性的妥協政策的機會。關於中國關稅問題所顯示的情況是，總的來說，下田吉郎對國際秩序的理解仍然固守在華盛頓海軍會議所建立的框架內。如果下田吉郎果斷與英國和美國一道承認中國徵收額外稅款的權利，這可能會幫助北京政府穩定其財政基礎。然而，似乎在北京的實際情況下，佐藤*誤解了下田吉郎的意圖，將其解釋為對中國有利，並將這一信息轉達給了中國方面。這至少導致佐藤與中國全權大使黃福建立了更為友好的關係。

北京還舉辦了關於外國在中國擁有的治外法權的國際會議。儘管下田吉郎主張解決治外法權爭端，並認為這對「促進我們的經濟利益有利」，他也認為完全終止治外法權的時機尚不成熟。與此同時，他還表達了反對國際管理中國及外國干涉中國內政的立場。總的來說，這次會議中的討論並未在治外法權問題上取得太大進展。還應注意的是，下田吉郎接受了北京政府在1926年10月提出的修訂《中日貿易協定》的提案。

*佐藤：佐藤貞雄，日本外交官，曾與下田吉郎合作。

資料B

以下段落摘自一本關於戰間期日本外交的書籍。

1931年秋，日本軍隊入侵滿洲，並將日本外交帶入了新的方向。報紙和廣播將這些勝利的好消息傳遞給那些因經濟蕭條和政治暗殺而心神不寧的人民。在1932年2月的總選舉中，日本選民壓倒性地支持了主張對經濟和外交問題採取「積極政策」的政友會。在軍方的要求下，日本國會一致決定將滿洲發展為一個由日本宗主權管轄的國家。

1932年和1933年執行這一政策使日本與西方發生衝突。當國際聯盟開始調查滿洲問題時，日本則反擊，正式承認其新的傀儡國——滿洲國，並開始走上「獨立外交」的新路線。為了支持這一新政策，日本的武裝部隊決定進行大規模的擴軍。如果軍事擴張推進得足夠遠，當然，這可能需要結束海軍限制。在日本領導人決定冒險走上武裝孤立的道路之前，他們決定先嘗試外交攻勢。然而，到1933年，外交努力未能有效抵消西方的批評，日本最終退出了國際聯盟。再一次，日本的孤立迫使其重新評估安全政策。

(a) 什麼因素阻礙下田吉郎在調整日本對中國的外交政策？試參考資料A，解釋你的答案。

(3分)

(b) 根據資料B，指出並解釋「新」日本外交對日本的兩個影響。

(2+2分)

(8分)

Early 20th Century Japanese Diplomacy

Study Sources A and B.

SOURCE A

The following passage is taken from a history book about Kijuro Shidehara, who served as the Foreign Minister of Japan from 1924-27 and from 1929-31. He favored a non-interventionist policy towards China. This passage is about the Japanese negotiations with China regarding Japanese tariffs and extraterritoriality within Chinese territory.

By sticking to the requirement of a clear economic benefit, Shidehara missed an opportunity for a more flexible give and take policy to be implemented. What the China tariff problem indicates is that, generally speaking, Shidehara's conception of the international order remained stuck within the framework established at the Washington Naval Conference. If Shidehara had taken the plunge of joining the UK and the US in recognizing China's right to collect additional taxes, it may well have helped the government in Beijing to stabilize its financial base. However, it seems that on the ground in Beijing, Saburi* had interpreted Shidehara's intentions as favorable to China and relayed this information to the Chinese side. This at least led to Saburi developing more friendly ties with Chinese plenipotentiary Huang Fu.

Beijing also hosted an international conference on extraterritorial rights that foreign nations had within China. While Shidehara favored a resolution to conflicts over extraterritorial rights, arguing that it was 'conducive to the furtherance of our economic benefit', he also felt that the time was not yet ripe for their full termination. At the same time, he also expressed his opposition to the international management of China and to foreign interference in China's domestic politics. All in all, the discussions conducted during this conference did not engender much progress on the problem of extraterritorial rights. It should also be noted that Shidehara accepted the October 1926 proposal of the Beijing government to revise the Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement.

*Saburi: Saburi Sadao, a diplomat of Japan who worked with Shidehara.

SOURCE B

The following passage is taken from a book about Japanese Diplomacy in the interwar period.

In the fall of 1931, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria and set Japanese diplomacy on a new course. Newspapers and radio brought the welcome news of these victories to a people distracted by economic depression and political assassinations, and in the general election of February 1932, Japanese voters gave overwhelming support to the Seiyükai party, which advocated a "positive policy" for both economic and foreign problems. At the request of the army, the Diet decided unanimously to develop Manchuria as a state under Japanese suzerainty.

The execution of this policy in 1932 and 1933 brought Japan and the West into conflict. When the League of Nations began to investigate the Manchurian question, Japan countered by formally recognizing Manchukuo, its new puppet state, and by embarking on a new course of "independent diplomacy." To support this new policy, Japan's armed services decided on a major rearmament effort. If the military buildup were carried far enough, of course, it might require an end to naval limitations. Before Japan's leaders decided to risk the solitary path of armed isolation, they decided to try a diplomatic offensive. But by 1933 the diplomats had failed to blunt Western criticism, and Japan had withdrawn from the League. Once again, Japan's isolation required a reassessment of its security policy.

a) What prevented Shidehara from taking a step further in changing Japanese foreign policy towards China? Explain your answer with reference to Source A.

(3 marks)

b) With reference to Source B, identify and explain two impacts the ‘new’ Japanese diplomacy had on Japan.

(4 marks)

c) “Japan’s foreign policy became increasingly aggressive from 1919-1937.” Do you agree with the statement? Explain your answer with reference to Sources A and B, and using your own knowledge.

(8 marks)

Answer

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